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BLACK AND WHITE AND READ ALL OVER: 
PRESS PROTECTION AFTER BRANZBURG 
SEAN W. KELLY† 
ABSTRACT 
 In 1972, the Supreme Court handed the press an apparent 
resounding defeat in Branzburg v. Hayes, declaring that the 
Constitution provided reporters no privilege from testifying about 
their confidential sources. This Note uses previously unpublished 
materials from the Justices’ personal files to illustrate the behind-the-
scenes deliberations as the Court shifted in ideology from the pro-
press posture established by Justice Hugo Black in the Pentagon 
Papers case to the anti-privilege position established by Justice Byron 
White one year later in Branzburg. It also examines the curious 
concurring opinion of Justice Lewis Powell in Branzburg and 
subsequent efforts to craft a qualified reporter’s privilege, arguing 
against further weakening press protection. 
INTRODUCTION 
At a White House press corps dinner in 2005, two San Francisco 
Chronicle reporters stood with President George W. Bush to accept 
the Edgar A. Poe Award for excellence in news coverage of national 
significance.1 Their investigation into the BALCO steroids scandal 
rocked baseball and other sports and “shook America’s sports world 
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 1. BALCO Reporters Win National Recognition; 2 Will Receive Prize at Washington 
Dinner, S.F. CHRON., Apr. 10, 2005, at A2. BALCO stands for Bay Area Laboratory Co-
Operative. 
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to its core.”2 Congressional hearings opened, Major League Baseball 
instituted a new steroid-testing policy, and the stories galvanized 
public sentiment to eliminate cheating in sport.3 “You’ve done a 
service,” the president, a former owner of baseball’s Texas Rangers, 
told Mark Fainaru-Wada, heartily shaking hands with the reporter 
and his co-writer, Lance Williams.4 
Thirteen months later, the United States Attorney’s Office 
served the reporters with subpoenas demanding that they testify 
before a grand jury investigating leaks in the BALCO case and give 
up their confidential sources.5 “[Y]ou’re a little bit shocked when you 
turn around and get a subpoena from [the] attorney general basically 
telling you to drop everything you believe in and give up information 
you promised you wouldn’t,” Fainaru-Wada later explained.6 Defying 
the subpoena, the Chronicle reporters refused to testify and were 
sentenced to eighteen months in prison for their “service.”7 Ironically, 
their sentences were longer than those of any of the principal suspects 
targeted in the original steroid probe by the FBI.8 Unbowed, Fainaru-
Wada and Williams refused to testify before the grand jury—one that 
itself was investigating leaks from another grand jury.9 Upon his 
 
 2. Mark Fainaru-Wada & Lance Williams, Address at the Meeting of the Commonwealth 
Club of California (July 7, 2006), available at http://abclocal.go.com/kgo/story?section= 
news&id=4625987. The reporters coauthored a book on the BALCO scandal. MARK FAINARU-
WADA & LANCE WILLIAMS, GAME OF SHADOWS: BARRY BONDS, BALCO, AND THE 
STEROIDS SCANDAL THAT ROCKED PROFESSIONAL SPORTS (2006).  
 3. Mark Fainaru-Wada & Lance Williams, Steroids Scandal: The BALCO Legacy: From 
Children to Pros, the Heat Is on to Stop Use of Performance Enhancers, S.F. CHRON., Dec. 24, 
2006, at A1. On August 7, 2007, San Francisco Giants slugger Barry Bonds hit his 756th career 
home run to become Major League Baseball’s all-time leader, surpassing the record of Hank 
Aaron. George Vecsey, Bonds Leaves Lasting Mark with No. 756, N.Y. TIMES, Aug. 8, 2007, at 
A1 (“He will never outdistance all the footnotes and asterisks and doubts and suspicions in our 
minds, but Barry Bonds hit those homers, all 756 of them. It’s his record.”). 
 4. Rick Reilly, It’s Clear Who’s Getting Creamed, SPORTS ILLUSTRATED, Oct. 30, 2006, at 
78; see also Christine Brennan, Feds and Steroids: Mixed Signals, USA TODAY, Sept. 21, 2006, at 
2C (reporting that President Bush said, “You’ve done a service”); Susan Sward, Prize-Winning 
Journalist Was Always Drawn to Investigative Reporting, S.F. CHRON., Sept. 22, 2006, at A14 
(same). 
 5. Adam Liptak, U.S. Subpoenas Newspaper for Sources in Steroid Case, N.Y. TIMES, May 
9, 2006, at A23. 
 6. Interview by Bob Costas with Mark Fainaru-Wada, on Costas on the Radio (Premiere 
Radio Networks radio broadcast Oct. 9, 2006), available at http://www.premiereradio.com/news/ 
view/197.html. 
 7. Joe Mozingo, Expose a Scandal, Face a Prison Term, L.A. TIMES, Nov. 14, 2006, at A1. 
 8. Lawrence Donegan, Reporters Who Broke BALCO Story Fight Prison Sentence, THE 
GUARDIAN (London), Jan. 11, 2007, (Sports Pages), at 6. 
 9. Liptak, supra note 5. 
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sentencing, Fainaru-Wada told the court, “I do not wish to spend 
even a minute in jail. However, I cannot—and will not—betray the 
promises I have made over the past three years” to confidential 
sources.10 After the reporters were sentenced, twenty-four states, 
news organizations, academics, attorneys, and others filed briefs on 
their behalf.11 The court stayed their imprisonment, pending appeal.12 
One week before the Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals planned to hear 
their argument, prosecutors dropped charges against the reporters 
when a defense lawyer admitted he leaked the information.13 
Fainaru-Wada and Williams were excoriated by a few fellow 
journalists who questioned their relationship with a source who 
exploited the leaks.14 Yet much of the material that made the BALCO 
case relevant to sports fans like President Bush would not have been 
made public but for their reports. As Professor Alexander Bickel 
famously wrote, “[T]he presumptive duty of the press is to publish, 
not to guard security or to be concerned with the morals of its 
sources. . . . [T]he press is a morally neutral, even an unconcerned, 
agent as regards the provenance of newsworthy material that comes 
to hand.”15 In court filings, federal prosecutors tried to convince a 
judge to force the Chronicle reporters to testify by noting they 
“may . . . have a profit motive” in the publication of their book, and 
their articles had little value.16 Allowing prosecutors to determine 
 
 10. Bob Egelko, Silence Means Prison, Judge Tells Reporters, S.F. CHRON., Sept. 22, 2006, 
at A1. 
 11. Sabin Russell, States, News Groups Back Chronicle’s BALCO Reporters, S.F. CHRON., 
Dec. 12, 2006, at A17. 
 12. T.J. Quinn et al., Reporters Still Facing Jail, DAILY NEWS (New York, NY), Dec. 23, 
2006, at 65. 
 13. Jesse McKinley, Reporters Avoid Jail in BALCO Case, N.Y. TIMES, Feb. 15, 2007, at 
D2. 
 14. See, e.g., Tim Rutten, Regarding Media: Protect Public Interest, Not Journalists’ Self-
Interest, L.A. TIMES, Feb. 17, 2007, at E1 (“To assert any form of journalistic privilege in a 
situation like that is something far worse than moral obtuseness. Conspiring with somebody you 
know is actively perverting the administration of justice to your mutual advantage is a betrayal 
of the public interest . . . .”). 
 15. ALEXANDER M. BICKEL, THE MORALITY OF CONSENT 81 (1975). 
 16. Bob Egelko, Feds Urge Judge: Force Reporters to Testify, S.F. CHRON., June 22, 2006, at 
A1 (citing a filing by federal prosecutors in response to a motion by the Chronicle to quash the 
subpoena). In the government’s motion, assistant U.S. attorneys revealed contempt for the 
articles in question and degraded the reporters’ professional judgment. “In contrast, the ‘leaked 
information’ served only to titillate and hold up to public ridicule those athletes who admitted 
using steroids before the grand jury.” Id. 
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journalistic ethics through selective subpoenas, however, is akin to 
allowing reporters to draft the Model Rules of Professional Conduct. 
Since the Supreme Court took up the issue of a reporter’s 
privilege not to testify as to the identity of sources in 1972 in 
Branzburg v. Hayes,17 the legal and reportorial landscape has shifted 
significantly.18 The press has, to a greater or lesser degree, enjoyed a 
privileged status among professions since the nation’s founding 
through its inclusion in the First Amendment. Thomas Jefferson 
famously wrote in 1787 that “were it left to me to decide whether we 
should have a government without newspapers, or newspapers 
without a government, I should not hesitate a moment to prefer the 
latter.”19 In the First Congress, James Madison likewise said, “[T]he 
freedom of the press, as one of the great bulwarks of liberty, shall be 
inviolable.”20 Justice Potter Stewart, who authored a stern dissent in 
Branzburg,21 noted that the press is “the only organized private 
business that is given explicit constitutional protection.”22 Yet even 
noted First Amendment lawyer and press champion Floyd Abrams 
declares that “[f]rom a distance of two centuries, the intentions of 
those who drafted the First Amendment are not at all obvious.”23 If 
they were, presumably there would be more clarity on when and why 
reporters, like Fainaru-Wada and Williams, face jail time for refusing 
to betray hard-won confidences. Through appeals to historical and 
structural press protections, attorneys for the press were initially able 
to make lemonade out of the sour decision laid at their feet by the 
 
 17. Branzburg v. Hayes, 408 U.S. 665 (1972). 
 18. For a detailed legal analysis of the Branzburg opinion and its aftereffects, see generally 
Erwin Chemerinsky, Protect the Press: A First Amendment Standard for Safeguarding 
Aggressive Newsgathering, 33 U. RICH. L. REV. 1143 (2000); Geoffrey R. Stone, Why We Need a 
Federal Reporter’s Privilege, 34 HOFSTRA L. REV. 39 (2005); and Jeffrey S. Nestler, Comment, 
The Underprivileged Profession: The Case for Supreme Court Recognition of the Journalist’s 
Privilege, 154 U. PA. L. REV. 201 (2005). 
 19. Letter from Thomas Jefferson to Edward Carrington (Jan. 16, 1787), in 11 THE PAPERS 
OF THOMAS JEFFERSON 49 (Julian P. Boyd ed., 1955). 
 20. 1 ANNALS OF CONG. 451 (Joseph Gales ed., 1834). 
 21. Branzburg, 408 U.S. at 725 (Stewart, J., dissenting) (stating that the Court’s opinion 
“invites . . . authorities to undermine the historic independence of the press by attempting to 
annex the journalistic profession as an investigative arm of government”). 
 22. Potter Stewart, Or of the Press, 26 HASTINGS L.J. 631, 633 (1975). 
 23. FLOYD ABRAMS, SPEAKING FREELY: TRIALS OF THE FIRST AMENDMENT xii (2005). 
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Supreme Court in Branzburg. Increasingly, however, they are unable 
to fend off multiplying subpoenas for reporters’ notes.24 
This Note uses previously unpublished materials from the files of 
Supreme Court Justices to lay bare the disintegration of press 
protection as the Court has shifted in ideology and argues against 
further erosion of a qualified reporter’s privilege after Branzburg. 
Although the ambiguous Branzburg opinion denies an absolute 
constitutional right for reporters to refuse to reveal sources, this Note 
finds that a careful reading of the opinion—keeping in mind the 
Justices’ reasoning—mandates both judicial and prosecutorial 
discretion when compelling journalists to testify. Part I features an in-
depth look at the decisions behind the Branzburg decision, including 
notes from various Justices’ files. It also includes an examination of a 
previously unpublished concurring opinion by Chief Justice Warren 
Burger in Branzburg. Part II examines the transition in Supreme 
Court jurisprudence from Justice Hugo Black, who wrote for the 
majority in favor of the press in the Pentagon Papers case,25 to Justice 
Byron White, who wrote for the majority against the press one year 
later in Branzburg. Part III examines the lack of proper prosecutorial 
and judicial discretion shown in cases involving reporters compelled 
to testify before grand juries. A careful reading of the Branzburg 
decision shows that prosecutors must use considerable discretion 
when subpoenaing reporters. Although the Supreme Court became 
less protective of the press in the early 1970s, it nevertheless in 
Branzburg relied upon prosecutorial and judicial discretion as the 
fail-safe in protecting the press and the public’s right to know. Judges 
and prosecutors, however, have ignored that fail-safe, basing their 
actions on an ultimately misguided interpretation of Branzburg. 
I.  BRANZBURG 360˚ 
Exactly 365 days after the Pentagon Papers decision,26 the Court 
issued its opinion in Branzburg v. Hayes.27 The decision combined 
 
 24. See David Carr, The Media Equation: Subpoenas and the Press, N.Y. TIMES, Nov. 27, 
2006, at C1 (quoting Hearst Corporation general counsel Eve Burton as saying, on the increase 
in subpoenas, “[i]f the government wins [the BALCO] case, every reporter’s notebook will be 
available to the government for the asking”). 
 25. New York Times Co. v. United States, 403 U.S. 713 (1971). 
 26. New York Times Co. v. United States was decided on June 30, 1971. 
 27. The decision in Branzburg v. Hayes, 408 U.S. 665 (1972), was issued June 29, 1972. The 
year 1972 was a leap year. 
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three cases involving claims of privilege by reporters, including 
Caldwell v. United States28 and In re Pappas.29 
The Justices split sharply on whether reporters have a 
constitutional privilege to refuse to testify before a grand jury. 
Writing for a 5–4 majority, Justice Byron White held that no 
constitutional privilege exists, either absolute or qualified.30 Justice 
Lewis Powell, although joining the majority, wrote a concurring 
opinion that sought to split the atom by proposing a case-by-case 
balancing test.31 The dissenting Justices tersely found that reporters 
do have a constitutional privilege to refuse to identify confidential 
sources.32 Mindful of the blistering dissent, which referenced the 
“Court’s crabbed view of the First Amendment,”33 the majority 
hinged its analysis on the discretion of judges and prosecutors and 
noted that “news gathering is not without its First Amendment 
protections, and grand jury investigations if instituted or conducted 
other than in good faith, would pose wholly different issues for 
resolution under the First Amendment.”34 
Trailing only Roe v. Wade,35 some scholars have pronounced 
Branzburg the Burger Court’s second-most controversial decision.36 
 
 28. Caldwell v. United States, 434 F.2d 1081 (9th Cir. 1970). 
 29. In re Pappas, 266 N.E.2d 297 (Mass. 1971). 
 30. Branzburg, 408 U.S. at 667 (“The issue in these cases is whether requiring newsmen to 
appear and testify before state or federal grand juries abridges the freedom of speech and press 
guaranteed by the First Amendment. We hold that it does not.”); see also Cohen v. Cowles 
Media Co., 501 U.S. 663, 669 (1991) (“[T]he First Amendment [does not] relieve a newspaper 
reporter of the obligation shared by all citizens to respond to a grand jury subpoena and answer 
questions relevant to a criminal investigation, even though the reporter might be required to 
reveal a confidential source.”). 
 31. Branzburg, 408 U.S. at 710 (Powell, J., concurring). 
 32. Id. at 712 (Douglas, J., dissenting) (“It is my view that there is no ‘compelling need’ 
that can be shown which qualifies the reporter’s immunity from appearing or testifying before a 
grand jury, unless the reporter himself is implicated in a crime.”); id. at 725 (Stewart, J., 
dissenting) (noting a reporter’s “constitutional right to a confidential relationship with his 
source”). 
 33. Id. at 725 (Stewart, J., dissenting). 
 34. Id. at 708 (majority opinion) (“Grand juries are subject to judicial control and 
subpoenas to motions to quash. We do not expect courts will forget that grand juries must 
operate within the limits of the First Amendment as well as the Fifth.”). 
 35. Roe v. Wade, 410 U.S. 113 (1973). 
 36. See Alpheus Thomas Mason, Whence and Whither the Burger Court? Judicial Self-
Restraint: A Beguiling Myth, 41 REV. POL. 3, 21 (1979) (“Except for its ruling outlawing state 
abortion laws, no decision of the Burger Court has aroused deeper concern among citizens and 
dissenting justices than Branzburg v. Hayes.”). 
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The “ambiguously” decided37 case was the product of deep divisions 
and heated debate within the Court, as illustrated by the Justices’ 
private papers. 
A. The Press 
In the late 1960s, Louisville Journal-Courier reporter Paul 
Branzburg uncovered local hashish manufacturing and a burgeoning 
drug trade.38 When subpoenaed to testify about his sources before 
grand juries, Branzburg refused for fear of disclosing his hard-won 
confidences.39 Branzburg was no ordinary reporter at a regional daily 
newspaper. He was a Harvard Law School graduate who would go on 
to be a top journalist at the Detroit Free Press.40 
The Court joined Paul Branzburg’s case with those of Earl 
Caldwell, a New York Times reporter who covered the Black Panther 
Party and other militant groups and refused to give up notes and tape 
recordings of interviews, and Paul Pappas, a television reporter who 
refused to testify before a grand jury about what he had learned 
inside a Black Panthers headquarters.41 
After the Supreme Court’s ruling, Paul Branzburg was sentenced 
to six months in prison, but the Michigan governor refused to 
extradite the reporter back to Kentucky, and he never served a day in 
jail.42 “When the legal drama finally ended, I still had not revealed my 
sources,” Branzburg said in 1992.43 “I knew all along it would end that 
way.”44 
B. The Majority 
In conference after oral argument, it quickly became apparent 
that the reporters would receive little sympathy from the Court. Chief 
Justice Warren Burger and Justices White, Harry Blackmun, and 
William Rehnquist were disinclined to grant any privilege, let alone 
 
 37. ABRAMS, supra note 23, at 69. 
 38. Branzburg, 408 U.S. at 667; FRANCIS WILKINSON, ESSAYS IN ESSENTIAL LIBERTY: 
FIRST AMENDMENT BATTLES FOR A FREE PRESS 91 (1992). 
 39. WILKINSON, supra note 38, at 91–93. 
 40. Id. 
 41. Branzburg, 408 U.S. at 672–73, 675–76. 
 42. WILKINSON, supra note 38, at 93. 
 43. Id. 
 44. Id. 
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one with a constitutional dimension.45 Justice Powell would join them, 
to an uncertain degree.46 White addressed the conference, saying, 
“Presently, I don’t think I’d establish any privilege at all . . . . I would 
not in any event allow a privilege to the extent of keeping confidential 
what [he] has seen [of an] actual crime.”47 Chief Justice Burger, 
according to Douglas’s conference notes, said it was a matter of 
common law, not constitutional law.48 “He was witness to [a] criminal 
act,” Burger said, according to Douglas.49 “No constitutional 
protection.”50 
Blackmun’s private notes reveal his inner thoughts on the case. 
Among the things he listed under “Am impressed by,” Blackmun 
included “For 200 years we have got along all right,” “We are 
concerned here with crime,” “Can assert his defenses just as everyone 
else can,” and “We should be able to handle this short of a 
constitutional privilege—yet Kentucky’s treatment bothers me.”51 
“Why has this never been raised before in over 200 years?” 
Blackmun wrote.52 “What this case seems to amount to, for me, is an 
all out attack on the grand jury system.”53 Blackmun wrote that he 
“hesitate[s] to impinge on the grand jury function or to expand First 
Amendment rights in this context.”54 
Rehnquist, new to the Court like Powell, took an originalist 
position. “Framers no contemplate,” Rehnquist stated, according to 
 
 45. See Conference Notes of Justice Harry A. Blackmun in Branzburg v. Hayes (Feb. 25, 
1972) (unpublished manuscript, on file with the Harry A. Blackmun Papers, Library of 
Congress, Box 138) [hereinafter Blackmun, Conference Notes in Branzburg]; Conference Notes 
of Justice William O. Douglas in Branzburg v. Hayes (Feb. 25, 1972) (unpublished manuscript, 
on file with the William O. Douglas Papers, Library of Congress, Box 1547) [hereinafter 
Douglas, Conference Notes in Branzburg]; Conference Notes of Justice Lewis F. Powell, Jr., in 
Branzburg v. Hayes (Feb. 25, 1972) (unpublished manuscript, on file with the Lewis F. Powell, 
Jr., Papers, Powell Archives, Washington & Lee University School of Law, Box 147) 
[hereinafter Powell, Conference Notes in Branzburg]. 
 46. See Branzburg, 408 U.S. at 709–10 (Powell, J., concurring). 
 47. BERNARD SCHWARTZ, THE ASCENT OF PRAGMATISM: THE BURGER COURT IN 
ACTION 165 (1990). 
 48. Douglas, Conference Notes in Branzburg, supra note 45. 
 49. Id. 
 50. Id. 
 51. Blackmun, Conference Notes in Branzburg, supra note 45, Box 139. Blackmun often 
used shorthand, but his words are spelled out in this Note. Indecipherable words and phrases 
have been omitted. 
 52. Id. 
 53. Id. 
 54. Id. 
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Blackmun’s shorthand.55 But Rehnquist ultimately may have been in a 
compromised position on the case, having served as the Justice 
Department’s primary spokesman for its policy of subpoenaing 
reporters during investigations into the Black Panthers and other 
militant groups while he was assistant attorney general.56 Rehnquist 
refused to recuse himself from the case and “showed no 
consciousness of impropriety.”57 
Interestingly and perhaps as a result of Burger’s appeal to 
common law, the Justices consulted a 1963 British case on the subject, 
and several included it in their related case files.58 In Attorney-General 
v. Mulholland,59 the Queen’s Bench stated: 
Take the clergyman, the banker or the medical man. None of these 
is entitled to refuse to answer when directed by a judge . . . . The 
judge will respect the confidences which each member of these 
honourable professions receives in the course of it, and will not 
direct him to answer unless not only it is relevant but also it is a 
proper and, indeed, necessary question in the course of justice to be 
put and answered.60 
Thus, the common law, according to their lordships in deciding 
Mulholland, accords journalists consideration similar to clergy, 
doctors, or those in fiduciary positions. The inclusion of the term 
“necessary question” in the Mulholland case indicates that under the 
law of England, questions put to reporters to reveal sources must be 
necessary to justice. It indicates an evidentiary privilege could be 
accorded reporters, and its inclusion in the Justices’ case files may 
help explain the similar position taken by Justice Lewis Powell in his 
notable concurrence. 
 
 55. Id. 
 56. JOHN P. MACKENZIE, THE APPEARANCE OF JUSTICE 240 (1974). 
 57. Id. at 241. 
 58. See Justice William J. Brennan’s Copy of the Queen’s Bench Opinion in Attorney-
General v. Mulholland, in the Branzburg v. Hayes Case File (undated) (unpublished manuscript, 
on file with the William J. Brennan, Jr., Papers, Library of Congress, Box I:261); Justice 
Thurgood Marshall’s Copy of the Queen’s Bench Opinion in Attorney-General v. Mulholland, in 
the Branzburg v. Hayes Case File (undated) (unpublished manuscript, on file with the 
Thurgood Marshall Papers, Library of Congress, Box 83). Brennan’s celebrated year-end case 
histories, alas, do not include a review of Branzburg. See Jim Newton, The Brennan Memos, 
SLATE, Jan. 9–11, 2007, http://www.slate.com/id/2156940 (excerpting Brennan’s “extraordinary 
annual memoranda documenting the court’s work”). 
 59. Att’y-Gen. v. Mulholland, (1963) 2 Q.B. 477. 
 60. Id. at 489–90 (finding no common-law reporter’s privilege). 
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C. The Wild Card 
Few Supreme Court opinions have caused more head scratching, 
even among contemporaneous brethren, than Justice Lewis Powell’s 
three-quarter page concurrence in Branzburg.61 Although he joined 
the majority in rejecting a constitutional privilege, Powell did so only 
assuming a base level of judicial and prosecutorial discretion. He 
suggested a balancing test for an evidentiary privilege: 
The asserted claim to privilege should be judged on its facts by the 
striking of a proper balance between freedom of the press and the 
obligation of all citizens to give relevant testimony with respect to 
criminal conduct. The balance of these vital constitutional and 
societal interests on a case-by-case basis accords with the tried and 
traditional way of adjudicating such questions.62 
From the moment it appeared, Powell’s opinion has been treated 
as everything from the controlling opinion to a side note akin to 
dictum. The “singularly opaque,”63 “oddball”64 opinion led some to 
consider the Court “really split 4-1-4, with Justice Powell’s lone 
concurrence bearing the greatest weight of the Court’s authority.”65 
Combined with Powell’s later concurrence in Zurcher v. Stanford 
Daily,66 the opinion “left the constitutional waters of press privilege 
somewhat murky.”67 
Powell’s comments in conference clarify the reasoning behind his 
opinion. He said, “It would be unwise to give the press any 
constitutional privilege and we’re writing on a clean slate, so we don’t 
have to give constitutional status to newsmen. I’d leave it to the 
legislatures to create one.”68 Although he voted with the majority in 
Branzburg, he wrote, “I don’t agree with much of Ky. opinion but if 
 
 61. Branzburg v. Hayes, 408 U.S. 665, 709–10 (1972) (Powell, J., concurring); see Sonja R. 
West, Concurring in Part & Concurring in the Confusion, 104 MICH. L. REV. 1951, 1953–54 
(2006) (discussing the confusion surrounding the authority of Justice Powell’s Branzburg 
concurrence). 
 62. Branzburg, 408 U.S. at 710 (Powell, J., concurring). 
 63. James C. Goodale, Branzburg v. Hayes and the Developing Qualified Privilege for 
Newsmen, 26 HASTINGS L.J. 709, 709 (1975). 
 64. Stephen Bates, Getting to the Source: The Curious Evolution of Reporters’ Privilege, 
SLATE, Dec. 26, 2003, http://www.slate.com/id/2093187 (last visited Sept. 27, 2007). 
 65. WILKINSON, supra note 38, at 104. 
 66. Zurcher v. Stanford Daily, 436 U.S. 547, 576 (1978) (upholding a search warrant for the 
files of a student newspaper in an attempt to get photographs of alleged illegal activity). 
 67. LEE C. BOLLINGER, IMAGES OF A FREE PRESS 19 (1991). 
 68. SCHWARTZ, supra note 47, at 165. 
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there is no 1st Amend. Privilege, this is merely a state case.”69 
Likewise, he voted to affirm in Pappas, even though he wrote, “I 
don’t like [the] opinion or result.”70 He continued, “[A]s I have 
concluded there is no constitutional privilege, I have no choice but to 
affirm.”71 Powell joined White’s majority opinion, but drafted his 
concurrence to “emphasize what seems to me to be the limited nature 
of the Court’s holding.”72 
Justice Stewart quickly redrafted his dissent to account for 
Powell’s ambiguous concurrence.73 The second draft—the published 
version of the dissent—called Powell’s separate opinion “enigmatic”74 
and stated that “[t]he disclaimers in Mr. Justice Powell’s concurring 
opinion leave room for the hope that in some future case the Court 
may take a less absolute position in this area.”75 
Powell’s private writings reveal his own less-than-absolute 
position. His notes immediately after argument show that although he 
did not believe there was an absolute constitutional privilege, he felt 
that a court must engage in “balancing First Amendment interests 
against the other interests involved.”76 Powell wrote in longhand on 
his notes in Caldwell: 
My vote turned on my conclusion—after hearing arguments of 
counsel & re-reading principal briefs—that we should not establish a 
constitutional privilege. If we did this, the problems that would flow 
from it would be difficult to foresee: e.g. applying a privilege of 
 
 69. Powell, Conference Notes in Branzburg, supra note 45, Box 146, 70-85. 
 70. Conference Notes of Justice Lewis F. Powell, Jr., in In re Pappas (Feb. 25, 1972) 
(unpublished manuscript, on file with the Lewis F. Powell, Jr., Papers, Powell Archives, 
Washington & Lee University School of Law, Box 146). 
 71. Id. 
 72. Branzburg v. Hayes, 408 U.S. 665, 709 (1972) (Powell, J., concurring). 
 73. Changes from the first draft of the dissent to the second draft reflect this hasty 
adjustment. Compare First Draft, Dissent of Justice Potter Stewart in Branzburg v. Hayes (June 
23, 1972) (unpublished manuscript, on file with the Thurgood Marshall Papers, Library of 
Congress, Box 83), with Second Draft, Dissent of Justice Potter Stewart in Branzburg v. Hayes 
(June 23, 1972) (unpublished manuscript, on file with the Thurgood Marshall Papers, Library of 
Congress, Box 83) [hereinafter Stewart, Branzburg Dissent, Second Draft]. 
 74. Branzburg, 408 U.S. at 725 (Stewart, J., dissenting); see also Stewart, Branzburg 
Dissent, Second Draft, supra note 73 (including Justice Stewart’s revised language from the first 
draft of his dissent). 
 75. Branzburg, 408 U.S. at 746 n.36. 
 76. Tentative Impressions of Justice Lewis F. Powell, Jr., in Branzburg v. Hayes (Feb. 23, 
1972) (unpublished manuscript, on file with the Lewis F. Powell, Jr., Papers, Powell Archives, 
Washington & Lee University School of Law, Box 146). 
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const. dimensions to grand jurys [sic], petite juries, congressional 
committees, etc. . . . And who are “newsmen”—how to define?77 
But, Powell added, “I will make clear in an opinion . . . that there is a 
privilege analogous to an evidentiary one, which courts should 
recognize & apply in case by case to protect confidential 
information.”78 
Unfortunately, Powell’s private notes offer little further guidance 
about the exact dimensions of the evidentiary privilege that should be 
accorded reporters. Unlike his voluminous notes on later cases like 
Regents of the University of California v. Bakke,79 Powell’s archived 
material on Branzburg fills just one thin folder.80 His Caldwell and 
Pappas files hold little more.81 
It does seem clear that Powell never entirely agreed with the 
majority opinion, despite joining it. Anthony Lewis, the New York 
Times writer and legal scholar with whom Powell often corresponded, 
wrote the Justice in 1975 to compliment his First Amendment 
jurisprudence.82 “[Y]our opinions in this area are something special,” 
Lewis wrote. “The dialogue with Justice White is especially 
interesting, starting with Branzburg.”83 Mr. Lewis’s letter shows that 
many of those close to Powell believed the Justice never fully joined 
White’s absolute rejection of a reporter’s privilege. 
 
 77. Conference Notes of Justice Lewis F. Powell, Jr., in United States v. Caldwell (Feb. 25, 
1972) (unpublished manuscript, on file with the Lewis F. Powell, Jr., Papers, Powell Archives, 
Washington & Lee University School of Law, Box 146) [hereinafter Powell, Conference Notes 
in Caldwell]. 
 78. Id. 
 79. Regents of the Univ. of Cal. v. Bakke, 438 U.S. 265 (1978). 
 80. Lewis F. Powell, Jr., Papers, Powell Archives, Washington & Lee University School of 
Law, Box 146. Powell had been seated for just forty-eight days when Branzburg was argued on 
Feb. 23, 1972. Powell and Rehnquist took the oath of office on Jan. 7, 1972. Paul C. 
Bartholomew, The Supreme Court of the United States, 1971–1972, 25 W. POL. Q. 761, 761 
(1972). Although his judicial philosophy may have differed from his predecessor’s, Powell took 
two of Black’s clerks for the term in 1972. JOHN C. JEFFRIES, JUSTICE LEWIS F. POWELL, JR. 
242 (1994). 
 81. Lewis F. Powell, Jr., Papers, Powell Archives, Washington & Lee University School of 
Law, Box 146. 
 82. Letter from Anthony Lewis to Justice Lewis F. Powell, Jr., (Mar. 31, 1975) (on file with 
the Lewis F. Powell, Jr., Papers, Washington & Lee University School of Law, Box 120). 
 83. Id. The case name is underlined in the original letter. 
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D. The Dissenters 
Justice Potter Stewart authored the dissent in Branzburg, finding 
a constitutional privilege for reporters and excoriating “[t]he Court’s 
crabbed view of the First Amendment.”84 Justices William Brennan 
and Thurgood Marshall joined the dissent. Justice William O. 
Douglas filed a separate dissent also finding a constitutional privilege 
but focusing on Earl Caldwell, the New York Times reporter.85 
Justice Stewart had been a reporter both while in college at Yale 
and at the Cincinnati Times-Star.86 Time magazine offered him a 
position, but he went to law school instead.87 By dissenting in 
Branzburg, Stewart was effectively reversing his circuit court position 
in Garland v. Torre.88 But, as Justice Stewart said in conference, 
“constitutional law develops in a hurry.”89 Stewart was “tentative,”90 
but reportedly said, “[t]he First Amendment requires some kind of 
qualified privilege for confidences to reporters.”91 In the dissent, 
Stewart famously warned against “annex[ing] the journalistic 
profession as an investigative arm of government.”92 
The other Justices who joined Stewart were less predisposed to 
accepting the press’ arguments. “I no like reporters,” was Justice 
William Brennan’s first statement at the conference, as summarized 
in Blackmun’s shorthand.93 “But press is important to be free.”94 
 
 84. Branzburg v. Hayes, 408 U.S. 665, 725 (1972) (Stewart, J., dissenting). 
 85. Id. at 724–25 (Douglas, J., dissenting). 
 86. Tinsley E. Yarbrough, Justice Potter Stewart: Decisional Patterns in Search of Doctrinal 
Moorings, in THE BURGER COURT: POLITICAL AND JUDICIAL PROFILES 375, 390 (Charles M. 
Lamb & Stephen C. Halpern eds., 1991). 
 87. Id. 
 88. Garland v. Torre, 259 F.2d 545, 549–50 (2d Cir. 1958) (finding no constitutional 
privilege for a reporter to refuse to disclose the name of an informant in a defamation case 
involving actress Judy Garland). Justice Powell’s conference notes state that Stewart said his 
“views have evolved since Garland v. Torre.” Powell, Conference Notes in Caldwell, supra note 
77. 
 89. Conference Notes of Justice Harry A. Blackmun in United States v. Caldwell (Feb. 25, 
1972) (unpublished manuscript, on file with the Harry A. Blackmun Papers, Library of 
Congress, Box 138) [hereinafter Blackmun, Conference Notes in Caldwell]. 
 90. Powell, Conference Notes in Caldwell, supra note 77. 
 91. SCHWARTZ, supra note 47, at 165. 
 92. Branzburg v. Hayes, 408 U.S. 665, 725 (1972) (Stewart, J., dissenting). 
 93. Blackmun, Conference Notes in Caldwell, supra note 89. 
 94. Id. 
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Brennan supported the privilege for reporters, even though it “may 
not be absolute (as Hugo [Black] thought).”95 
Justice Thurgood Marshall said he thought “the press 
exaggerates the importance of [confidentiality],” but joined the 
dissent anyway.96 At conference, he argued for a qualified privilege 
and said the reporter had a choice: “Go to [the grand jury] first or . . . 
move to quash at outset—with burden on newsman.”97 He “cannot 
tell the grand jury to go to hell,” Marshall said.98 
In his separate dissent, Justice William O. Douglas stated that “a 
newsman has an absolute right not to appear before a grand jury,” 
but he confined his dissent to the Caldwell case.99 Douglas wrote at 
least seven drafts of his dissent, focusing on “privacy of association” 
as much as press freedom.100 Douglas’s conference notes offer little 
insight into his reasoning. They are little more than one-liners from 
each Justice and do not elaborate on his own thoughts at the time.101 
Blackmun privately scoffed at Douglas’s dissenting analysis, 
reading with a critical eye and making caustic comments in the 
margins.102 When Douglas noted that reporter Caldwell is “black,” 
Blackmun underlined the passage and wrote “So?” nearby.103 At the 
end of Douglas’s circulated dissent, Blackmun wrote, “The strong last 
[paragraphs] are weakened by the first nine!”104 When Douglas wrote 
about the “amazing position that First Amendment rights are to be 
balanced against other needs or conveniences of government,” 
Blackmun underlined “amazing” and noted, “Only to WOD [William 
 
 95. Powell, Conference Notes in Caldwell, supra note 77. 
 96. SCHWARTZ, supra note 47, at 165. 
 97. Powell, Conference Notes in Caldwell, supra note 77. 
 98. Blackmun, Conference Notes in Caldwell, supra note 89. 
 99. Branzburg v. Hayes, 408 U.S. 665, 711–12 (1972) (Douglas, J., dissenting). Douglas 
stated that his view of the First Amendment was close to that of Professor Alexander 
Meiklejohn, who declared that it is “an absolute.” Id. at 713. 
 100. Id. at 715. Douglas’s papers include seven drafts of his dissent, with sections cut and 
pasted throughout. The seventh draft is virtually identical to his published dissent. Compare 
Seventh Draft, Dissent of Justice William O. Douglas in United States v. Caldwell (Apr. 1972) 
(unpublished manuscript, on file with the William O. Douglas Papers, Library of Congress, Box 
1547), with Branzburg, 408 U.S. at 711–12 (Douglas, J., dissenting). 
 101. Douglas, Conference Notes in Branzburg, supra note 45. 
 102. Justice Harry A. Blackmun’s Copy of Fourth Draft, Dissent of Justice William O. 
Douglas in United States v. Caldwell (May 30, 1972) (unpublished manuscript, on file with the 
Harry A. Blackmun Papers, Library of Congress, Box 139). 
 103. Id. 
 104. Id. 
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O. Douglas].”105 When Douglas wrote “that the fences of the law and 
the tradition that has protected the press are broken down,” 
Blackmun wrote, “They were never up to this point.”106 
E. The Chief Justice Speaks . . . Softly 
After the Branzburg dissenters circulated their first draft and 
Powell wrote his concurrence, Chief Justice Burger—perhaps sensing 
the deepening divisions on the Court—fired back with a curt, two-
page concurring opinion that scolded the dissenters without 
advancing much new argument.107 Indeed, his never-before-published 
concurrence contains just one footnote.108 
It is unclear exactly why Burger did not publish his opinion, 
because his papers remain closed to the public.109 Yet his unpublished 
concurrence offers a stinging rebuke to the dissenters, and perhaps 
the Chief Justice did not wish to air the division so publicly. The 
dissent “takes a great leap and assert[s], without any foundation in 
history or other authority” that there is a reporter’s privilege, Burger 
wrote.110 “Surely,” the Chief Justice wrote, “the matter is not quite so 
simple.”111 
At conference, Burger said that no one, “except the President of 
the U.S.” could claim privilege from a grand jury subpoena.112 “He 
must go.”113 His draft concurrence said: 
An integral and what I consider mistaken step in the analysis of the 
three dissenters is the assumption that there is some constitutional 
right to gather news in a particular manner—in this case a 
constitutional right to refuse a grand jury subpoena or to refuse to 
give testimony before the grand jury.114 
 
 105. Id. 
 106. Id. 
 107. Draft Concurrence of Chief Justice Warren E. Burger in Branzburg v. Hayes (June 26, 
1972) (unpublished manuscript, on file with the William J. Brennan, Jr., Papers, Library of 
Congress, Box I:263) [hereinafter Burger, Draft Concurrence in Branzburg]. 
 108. Id. 
 109. Burger’s papers are closed to the public until the year 2026. The College of William and 
Mary, Warren E. Burger Online Exhibit, http://swem.wm.edu/exhibits/burger/index.cfm (last 
visited Sept. 27, 2007). 
 110. Burger, Draft Concurrence in Branzburg, supra note 107, at 1. 
 111. Id. 
 112. SCHWARTZ, supra note 47, at 165. 
 113. Blackmun, Conference Notes in Caldwell, supra note 89. 
 114. Burger, Draft Concurrence in Branzburg, supra note 107. 
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Burger’s draft opinion stated, “If there were any genuine, or even 
plausible, basis for the sweeping claim made here for reporters, one 
might well ask how a free press has flourished in America as no 
where else in the world for nearly 200 years, without the protection 
now asserted to be indispensable.”115 
Burger then answered his own question in his attempt to marshal 
the dissenters to his view. “The answer lies in part at least in the fact 
that by and large, the confidentiality of sources has been respected 
and governments have not sought needlessly to disturb the reporter-
informant relationship.”116 Here, the Chief Justice implies that a 
privilege might be found when the government widely fails to respect 
the importance of a reporter’s vow of confidentiality. In drafting his 
criticism of the dissent, Burger assumed that prosecutors would use 
considerable discretion in seeking subpoenas and that judges would 
do likewise when upholding them. 
II.  FROM BLACK TO WHITE 
In the October 1971 term, when Branzburg was decided, the 
Supreme Court underwent a dramatic shift. Justices Hugo Black and 
John Harlan left the Court in September 1971 and died shortly 
thereafter.117 They were replaced by Lewis F. Powell, Jr., and William 
Rehnquist, respectively.118 Black, who served on the high Court from 
1937 to 1971,119 took an “absolutist” position on the First 
Amendment.120 Black thought that “we must overprotect speech in 
order to protect speech that matters.”121 With his departure came a 
more pragmatic Court, one less inclined to grant broad protections to 
 
 115. Id. at 2. 
 116. Id. 
 117. Anthony Lewis, Give Me Liberty: Individual Rights in a Time of War, 13 MEDIA L. & 
POL’Y 6, 6 nn.1–2 (2004). 
 118. E.g., Alan B. Morrison, The Rehnquist Choice, 55 STAN. L. REV. 1457, 1457 (2003) 
(reviewing JOHN W. DEAN, THE REHNQUIST CHOICE: THE UNTOLD STORY OF THE NIXON 
APPOINTMENT THAT REDEFINED THE SUPREME COURT (2001)). 
 119. JOHN P. FRANK, INSIDE JUSTICE HUGO L. BLACK: THE LETTERS 1 (2000). 
 120. E.g., Daniel J. Solove, The Virtues of Knowing Less: Justifying Privacy Protections 
Against Disclosure, 53 DUKE L.J. 967, 978 (2003). 
 121. Harry Kalven, Jr., The Reasonable Man and the First Amendment: Hill, Butts, and 
Walker, 1967 SUP. CT. REV. 267, 294. 
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the press even though “[p]ress law . . . is largely a creature of the 
seventies.”122 
The shift in First Amendment jurisprudence was apparent in the 
Branzburg decision. With the absolutist Black gone, the majority fell 
in line with Justice Byron White, whose personal pique with the press 
may have influenced his judicial philosophy on cases involving 
journalists and media organizations.123 The fate of press protection 
had shifted from Black to White, and lower courts have been 
confused and contradictory ever since.124 
A. Justice Black 
When the Court granted certiorari in Branzburg,125 attorneys for 
the press figured they had four Justices on their side. “Justices Hugo 
Black, William O. Douglas, William J. Brennan and Thurgood 
Marshall all seemed to us to be likely votes,” press counsel Floyd 
Abrams later wrote.126 Justice Potter Stewart, a former reporter 
himself, would also come out solidly for the press, despite some of his 
more conservative inclinations on most civil liberties.127 In June 1971, 
Justice Black selected his clerks for the upcoming term, “indicating 
that he intended to carry on”128 even though he had been “too old and 
decrepit to marshal a Court” in the Pentagon Papers case the year 
before.129 
Born and raised in central Alabama, Hugo Black made a 
“Horatio Alger rise to the top.”130 Black’s work as a boy in Alabama 
at both conservative and Populist papers may have shaped his views 
 
 122. A.E. Dick Howard, The Burger Court and the First Amendment: A Framework, in THE 
FIRST AMENDMENT RECONSIDERED: NEW PERSPECTIVES ON THE MEANING OF FREEDOM OF 
SPEECH AND PRESS 129, 135 (Bill F. Chamberlin & Charlene J. Brown eds., 1982). 
 123. See, e.g., DENNIS J. HUTCHINSON, THE MAN WHO ONCE WAS WHIZZER WHITE: A 
PORTRAIT OF JUSTICE BYRON R. WHITE 383 (1998) (recounting an article calling White the 
“Javert of the American press” and accusing him of “pursu[ing] our editors and publishers 
with . . . cold fury”). 
 124. See infra Part III. 
 125. Justice Black was still on the Court when Branzburg was granted certiorari on May 3, 
1971. See Branzburg v. Hayes, 402 U.S. 942, 942 (1971) (mem.). 
 126. ABRAMS, supra note 23, at 3. 
 127. Yarbrough, supra note 86, at 390. 
 128. Mason, supra note 36, at 10. 
 129. FRANK, supra note 119, at 38. 
 130. Hugo L. Black, Jr., Foreword to INSIDE JUSTICE HUGO L. BLACK: THE LETTERS, supra 
note 119, at vii, viii. 
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on the press.131 Black and his brother worked a number of odd jobs 
growing up, but “[t]he boys’ most rewarding job was as the ‘printer’s 
devil’ at competing local newspapers. Because of their literacy, the 
boys qualified to set type, letter by letter, creating the galleys of hand-
driven presses.”132 Not only did Black set type, he sometimes wrote 
short news stories covering events in town or at the courthouse. 
Perhaps because of his childhood experiences, Black’s judicial 
philosophy belied his sometimes rocky relationship with the press. 
Indeed, “Black owed his whole political, and therefore his judicial, 
career to his ability to surmount a formidable opposition and a hostile 
press . . . .”133 His son said, “The press certainly had no reason to 
expect him to be their champion, considering the treatment he 
received at their hands during his lifetime.”134 Black had never “quite 
forgiven the press for the way he was treated” when his ties to the Ku 
Klux Klan as a young man in Alabama were brought up after his 
appointment to the Court, and he felt that “rich Republicans 
controlled the press.”135 Still, Black’s “conviction grew with each 
passing year that [the words of the First Amendment] mean more to 
the preservation of our democratic republic than any others.”136 With 
this conviction, he granted the press broad protection. 
With respect to First Amendment guarantees, Black was famous 
for his pronouncement, “No law means no law.”137 In the Pentagon 
Papers case, Solicitor General Erwin Griswold (perhaps unwisely) 
challenged Black on this point, stating 
Now Mr. Justice . . . . You say that “no law” means “no law,” and 
that should be obvious. I can only say . . . that to me it is equally 
obvious that “no law” does not mean “no law,” and I would seek to 
persuade the Court that this is true.138 
 
 131. STEVE SUITTS, HUGO BLACK OF ALABAMA: HOW HIS ROOTS AND EARLY CAREER 
SHAPED THE GREAT CHAMPION OF THE CONSTITUTION 84 (2005). 
 132. Id. 
 133. GERALD T. DUNNE, HUGO BLACK AND THE JUDICIAL REVOLUTION 270 (1977). 
 134. HUGO L. BLACK, JR., MY FATHER: A REMEMBRANCE 185 (1975). 
 135. ROGER K. NEWMAN, HUGO BLACK: A BIOGRAPHY 614 (1997). 
 136. BLACK, JR., supra note 134, at 183–84. 
 137. HUGO LAFAYETTE BLACK, A CONSTITUTIONAL FAITH 45 (1968). 
 138. ABRAMS, supra note 23, at 40. 
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Griswold’s “Alice in Wonderland” argument139 failed to persuade the 
Court, and Black “listened to it with evident delight.”140 
Black’s broad First Amendment interpretation was apparent in 
his other opinions as well. Black wrote a famous concurrence in New 
York Times v. Sullivan,141 the “crown jewel of First Amendment 
law.”142 And in his Bridges v. California143 opinion, Black stated, 
“[T]he First Amendment does not speak equivocally . . . . It must be 
taken as a command of the broadest scope that explicit language, read 
in the context of a liberty-loving society, will allow.”144 
But reliance on Black may have been questionable for press 
advocates in Branzburg. Had he lived, Black likely would have sided 
with the press position. Yet Black drew a thick, bright line between 
speech and conduct, absolutely protecting the former while offering 
the latter little protection.145 In a series of lectures at Columbia 
University in 1968, Black stated, “In giving absolute protection to free 
speech, . . . I have always been careful to draw a line between speech 
and conduct.”146 In Bridges v. California, Black weighed speech and 
conduct carefully in the context of criminal trials. “[F]ree speech and 
fair trials are two of the most cherished policies of our civilization, 
and it would be a trying task to choose between them.”147 A well-
pleaded argument by the government, focusing on the conduct of 
reporters in refusing to appear before a legitimately convened grand 
jury in a criminal probe, may have made the Alabama absolutist think 
twice before rubber-stamping the reporters’ argument. 
Despite this potential reservation, Black consistently took strong 
positions in favor of press protections while on the bench. “The 
Government’s power to censure the press was abolished so that the 
press would remain forever free to censure the Government,” he 
 
 139. NEWMAN, supra note 135, at 616. See LEWIS CARROLL, ALICE’S ADVENTURES IN 
WONDERLAND AND THROUGH THE LOOKING-GLASS 185 (Random House 2002) (1865) 
(“‘When I use a word,’ Humpty Dumpty said in rather a scornful tone, ‘it means just what I 
choose it to mean—neither more nor less.’”). 
 140. ABRAMS, supra note 23, at 40. 
 141. New York Times Co. v. Sullivan, 376 U.S. 254, 293–97 (1964) (Black, J., concurring). 
 142. ABRAMS, supra note 23, at xvi. 
 143. Bridges v. California, 314 U.S. 252 (1941). 
 144. Id. at 263. 
 145. William C. Warren, Foreword to BLACK, supra note 137, at ix, x (1968) (“[Black] 
carefully distinguishes conduct not protected by the First Amendment, such as picketing or 
demonstrating, even though utilized to communicate ideas.”). 
 146. BLACK, supra note 137, at 53. 
 147. Bridges, 314 U.S. at 260. 
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wrote in the Pentagon Papers case.148 “In my view, far from deserving 
condemnation for their courageous reporting, the New York Times, 
the Washington Post, and other newspapers should be commended 
for serving the purpose that the Founding Fathers saw so clearly.”149 
Some commentators believe that Branzburg and other press 
defeats before the high Court “would not have survived the scrutiny 
of former Justices Hugo Black and William O. Douglas [together].”150 
With Black gone, the tide for the press had turned.151 
B. Justice White 
Justice Byron White, known even to his clerks as “terse and 
gruff,”152 treated no one with more disdain than journalists. White was 
“anathema to the press,” a Justice Department colleague recalled.153 
Beginning during his time as an All-American on the University of 
Colorado football team, White was hounded by reporters looking for 
scoops on the most successful scholar-athlete ever to play college 
football.154 Later, his retirement from the Court in 1993 was greeted 
with a general sigh of relief from the Fourth Estate155 and even a 
caustic good riddance from many corners.156 He viewed the press with 
 
 148. New York Times Co. v. United States, 403 U.S. 713, 717 (1971) (Black, J., concurring). 
 149. Id. 
 150. Floyd Abrams, The Burger Court and the First Amendment: An Analysis, in THE FIRST 
AMENDMENT RECONSIDERED: NEW PERSPECTIVES ON THE MEANING OF FREEDOM OF 
SPEECH AND PRESS, supra note 122, at 138, 142. 
 151. Black’s relationship with Justice White was not close. “With [Justice] White, there was 
a real gulf of approach; there was respect, but no empathy.” FRANK, supra note 119, at 62. 
There is little documentation of their working relationship because, unfortunately, many of 
Black’s papers—some six hundred binders worth—were burned within months of his death. S. 
Sidney Ulmer, Bricolage and Assorted Thoughts on Working in the Papers of Supreme Court 
Justices, 35 J. POL. 286, 289 (1973). Although all his conference notes and sensitive files were 
burned, some of Justice Black’s papers are preserved in the Manuscript Division of the Library 
of Congress. Black was buried with several “10 cent copies of the Constitution in his suit 
pocket.” BLACK, JR., supra note 134, at 266. 
 152. Biographical Study Unveils Some of Justice Byron White’s Mystery, U. CHI. CHRON. 
Oct. 29, 1998, http://chronicle.uchicago.edu/981029/hutchinson.shtml (quoting former clerk and 
biographer Dennis Hutchinson). 
 153. See HUTCHINSON, supra note 123, at 449 (quoting Edwin O. Guthman, Press Sec’y, 
U.S. Dep’t of Justice). 
 154. Id. at 43 (calling it “Whizzermania”). 
 155. The “Fourth Estate” is common shorthand for the press. E.g., Howard Kurtz, Survey 
Finds Angst-Strained Wretches in the Fourth Estate, WASH. POST, May 24, 2004, at C1. 
 156. See HUTCHINSON, supra note 123, at 382–84 (noting that White was derided as “both a 
knave and a fool”). 
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“scorn” and “disdain.”157 A verse sung to White at his retirement 
party went: “He knows the First Amendment/He learned it up at 
Yale/But when he writes opinions/Reporters go to jail.”158 When he 
referred to “snoops” in California v. Greenwood,159 “many in the press 
assumed that he was referring, with some feeling, to them.”160 
White, who grew up poor in the beet fields of Wellington, 
Colorado, had little contact with the press before he arrived in 
Boulder to star on the gridiron for the Buffaloes.161 He arrived with 
“no clippings,” none of the oft-sensationalized newspaper accounts 
that followed star athletes of the day.162 Soon enough, his exploits on 
the football field would earn him the nickname “Whizzer” White, “a 
name he did not seek, did not like, and could not shake.”163 Despite 
his aversion to publicity, “White was irresistible copy” as he became 
the most famous scholar-athlete in America.164 Even as a Rhodes 
Scholar at Oxford, White was “dogged constantly by tabloid 
reporters.”165 After clerking and moving back to Denver in 1947, he 
told a friend he had just three goals: “[T]o practice law, raise a family, 
and keep my name out of the goddamn newspapers.”166 
Perhaps as a result of his experiences, Justice White was 
“unwilling to accept” Black’s absolutist First Amendment position, 
because, in his view, it meant that “the press remains completely 
unaccountable for its actions.”167 And White’s pragmatism led him to 
take “positions not clearly defined in terms of the alignments so 
important to Justice Black.”168 Unlike Black, “White . . . was no fan of 
press claims for broad First Amendment protection.”169 White’s view 
of the press was a “far cry from the traditional Fourth Estate image of 
 
 157. Id. at 5. 
 158. Perspectives on White: A Roundtable, 79 A.B.A. J. 68, 69 (1993). 
 159. California v. Greenwood, 486 U.S. 35, 40 (1988). 
 160. HUTCHINSON, supra note 123, at 450. 
 161. Id. at 14–18. 
 162. Id. at 25. 
 163. Id. at 39. 
 164. Id. at 67. 
 165. Id. at 5. 
 166. Id. 
 167. Allan Ides, The Jurisprudence of Justice Byron White, 103 YALE L.J. 419, 440 (1993). 
 168. Carl Brent Swisher, History’s Panorama and Justice Black’s Career, in HUGO BLACK 
AND THE SUPREME COURT: A SYMPOSIUM 37 (Stephen Parks Strickland ed., 1967). 
 169. ABRAMS, supra note 23, at 71. 
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the press,”170 and rather more akin to a traditional commercial 
enterprise.171 
But it is perhaps possible to extrapolate too much from White’s 
personal interactions with the press. “It is tempting to suppose . . . 
that Justice White’s experiences with nosy reporters in his days as a 
national sports celebrity left him hostile to the media. That view 
probably overstates the case,” writes former White clerk John C. P. 
Goldberg.172 Although “White felt used and demeaned—
commodified—by the media,”173 he may not have been as hostile 
toward the press as conventional wisdom suggests. It is probable that 
no other Supreme Court Justice gave more interviews over a lifetime 
than White. This started in his college years and continued through 
his days as a Rhodes Scholar, as a professional football player and 
Kennedy Justice Department official, and even after his retirement 
from the Court. Although White “hated” reporters, he gave dozens, if 
not hundreds, of interviews. As biographer Dennis Hutchinson 
describes, White had “unvarnished frankness with the press.”174 
In Branzburg, White pummeled claims of a constitutional 
privilege for reporters. But he then went on to caution against 
“[o]fficial harassment of the press” designed “to disrupt a reporter’s 
relationship with his news sources.”175 “[N]ews gathering is not 
without its First Amendment protections,” White noted, for “without 
some protection for seeking out the news, freedom of the press could 
be eviscerated.”176 The Branzburg opinion “reaffirms White’s 
consistency and evenhandness in cases involving the press.”177 
Similarly, some of White’s later judicial decisions recognized the 
importance of the Fourth Estate. Just two years after Branzburg, in 
 
 170. BOLLINGER, supra note 67, at 54. 
 171. Vincent A. Blasi, The Checking Value in First Amendment Theory, 1977 AM. B. 
FOUND. RES. J. 521, 593 (“[White] characterized the press as a private-interest group rather 
than an institution with a central function to perform in the constitutional system of checks and 
balances.”). 
 172. John C.P. Goldberg, Judging Reputation: Realism and Common Law in Justice White’s 
Defamation Jurisprudence, 74 U. COLO. L. REV. 1471, 1501 (2003). 
 173. Id. at 1508. 
 174. See HUTCHINSON, supra note 123, at 87. In his biography of White, Hutchinson cites 
one hundred different newspapers, magazines, and television broadcasts, many of which contain 
first-person interviews with the football player-scholar-Supreme Court Justice. Id. at 536–38. 
 175. Branzburg v. Hayes, 408 U.S. 665, 707–08 (1972). 
 176. Id. at 681, 707. 
 177. HUTCHINSON, supra note 123, at 361. 
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Miami Herald Publishing Co. v. Tornillo,178 White wrote eloquently of 
the favored position of the press.179 “[T]he First Amendment erects a 
virtually insurmountable barrier between government and the print 
media,” White wrote.180 The Court, he said, “remain[s] intensely 
skeptical about those measures that would allow government to 
insinuate itself into the editorial rooms of this Nation’s press.”181 
Although certainly no First Amendment absolutist, White did 
recognize that the press had an important and favored role to play in 
society. 
III.  BRANZBURG’S LEGACY 
The Branzburg decision, rightly, was initially seen as a sound 
rebuke to the press.182 But through wily lawyering, the press partially 
managed to snatch a narrow victory from the jaws of defeat for a 
while. Attorneys for media organizations nibbled around the edges of 
Branzburg, with New York Times counsel James C. Goodale 
commenting just three years later on the “developing qualified 
privilege for newsmen.”183 By 2007, forty-nine states and the District 
of Columbia had some form of protection for journalists by statute or 
case law.184 Ironically, it is highly unlikely that the local prosecutor 
who sought the testimony of reporter Branzburg in the early 1970s 
would do so in similar circumstances since the passage of a “shield” 
law in Kentucky.185 
Yet the inroads achieved after Branzburg were short lived. 
Federal authorities—specifically federal prosecutors emboldened by 
 
 178. Miami Herald Publ’g Co. v. Tornillo, 418 U.S. 241 (1974). 
 179. Id. at 259–63 (White, J., concurring) (finding that newspapers have complete editorial 
control of their publications on First Amendment grounds). 
 180. Id. at 259. 
 181. Id. 
 182. See Rodney A. Smolla, Information as Contraband: The First Amendment and Liability 
for Trafficking in Speech, 96 NW. U. L. REV. 1099, 1115 (2002) (noting “the apparently 
resounding defeat in Branzburg for the press”). 
 183. Goodale, supra note 63, at 709. 
 184. Stone, supra note 18, at 42; Sean Hill & Elizabeth Soja, Reigniting the Debate, THE 
NEWS MEDIA & LAW, Summer 2007, at 16, 17, available at http://www.rcfp.org/news/mag/31-
3/con-reigniti.html. (“[A]ll the . . . states, except for one, recognize some form of a privilege for 
journalists.”). The only state that has not recognized a privilege, either by statute or case law, is 
Wyoming. Nestler, supra note 18, at 226. 
 185. See KY. REV. STAT. ANN. § 421.100 (LexisNexis 2006) (forbidding forced disclosure of 
“the source of any information procured or obtained by [a journalist], and published in a 
newspaper or by a radio or television broadcasting station”). 
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recent decisions interpreting Branzburg—have led the charge against 
reporters. Since 2005, “it is . . . de rigueur to round up the reporters, 
haul them before a court, and threaten them with heavy fines and jail 
sentences if they don’t cough up names and details concerning their 
sources.”186 There is a particular minefield for reporters in the federal-
state divide. Reporters covering a breaking story often pay little heed 
to the potential jurisdictional turns a case may take down the line. 
Often it is unclear whether a case will be prosecuted federally or on 
the state level. In such instances, a reporter depending upon a state 
privilege instead may be haled into federal court depending upon 
jurisdictional questions wholly outside the scope of a reporter’s 
inquiry. 
Even in 1982, Floyd Abrams surmised that “[t]he area of 
confidential sources remains the single one most likely to provoke 
confrontation in the future.”187 Some twenty years later, Abrams said, 
“a spate of leak investigations” shows “a purposeful decision made by 
federal prosecutors . . . that the disclosure in one leak investigation 
after another of who provided information to the press is more 
important than the press’s ability to gather news and report it to the 
public.”188 Federal prosecutors, emboldened in part by misguided 
dicta by Judge Richard Posner, are wrongly interpreting Branzburg. 
They fail to recognize the principle that a majority of circuits 
established before Judge Posner entered the debate—that Branzburg 
is a complicated decision that mandates some level of prosecutorial 
and judicial discretion. 
A. Posner’s Perplexity 
Scholarly and popular authors have traced the reemergence of 
pressing reporters to testify to dicta found in a 2003 opinion authored 
by influential Seventh Circuit Judge Richard Posner.189 In McKevitt v. 
 
 186. Theodore B. Olson, Commentary, A Much-Needed Shield for Reporters, WASH. POST, 
June 29, 2006, at A27. 
 187. Abrams, supra note 150, at 143. 
 188. ABRAMS, supra note 23, at 281. 
 189. For examples in law reviews, see Erik W. Laursen, Putting Journalists on Thin Ice: 
McKevitt v. Pallasch, 73 U. CIN. L. REV. 293, 294 (2004); Jaynie Randall, Freeing Newsgathering 
from the Reporter’s Privilege, 114 YALE L.J. 1827, 1829–34 (2005); Leslie Siegel, Trampling on 
the Fourth Estate, 67 OHIO ST. L.J. 469, 494–95 (2006); and West, supra note 61, at 1952 n.7. For 
examples in the popular press, see Bates, supra note 64, and Jeffrey Toobin, Name That Source: 
Why Are the Courts Leaning on Journalists?, NEW YORKER, Jan. 16, 2006, at 30, 34. 
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Pallasch,190 Posner sought to flatten decisions in the majority of other 
circuits finding at least a qualified reporter’s privilege.191 It may be no 
coincidence that the leading prosecutorial efforts to compel reporters 
to testify emerged from the U.S. Attorney’s Office in Chicago,192 
where Posner holds court. 
Posner calls Powell’s concurrence in Branzburg a “notorious 
example”193 of “casting the essential fifth vote for the ‘majority’ 
opinion while also writing a separate opinion qualifying the Court’s 
opinion.”194 This, Posner says, is a “bad practice because it leaves the 
reader uncertain whether the majority opinion or the concurring 
opinion should be regarded as the best predictor of how the Court 
would decide a similar case in the future.”195 
Judge Posner is known, celebrated, and reviled for his dicta.196 In 
McKevitt, his penchant for professing opinions on matters not 
essential to the case at hand led him to inveigh against courts that find 
even a qualified privilege for reporters. “A large number of cases 
conclude, rather surprisingly in light of Branzburg, that there is a 
reporter’s privilege, though they do not agree on its scope,” a 
perplexed Posner wrote.197 He then summarily disregarded cases 
decided in seven other circuits as contrary to his own reading of 
Branzburg.198 Posner went on to dismiss press concerns of 
 
 190. McKevitt v. Pallasch, 339 F.3d 530 (7th Cir. 2003). 
 191. Id. at 534–35 (rejecting First Amendment protection for reporters against subpoenas in 
a criminal defendant’s attempt to obtain nonconfidential records from biographers of a 
government witness). 
 192. See Katharine Q. Seelye, Journalists Say Threat Of Subpoena Intensifies, N.Y. TIMES, 
July 4, 2005, at C1. 
 193. Richard A. Posner, The Supreme Court, 2004 Term—Foreword: A Political Court, 119 
HARV. L. REV. 31, 95 n.191 (2005). 
 194. Id. at 95. 
 195. Id. 
 196. E.g., Chi. Council of Lawyers, Evaluation of the United States Court of Appeals for the 
Seventh Circuit, 43 DEPAUL L. REV. 673, 799–800 (1994) (“Judge Posner’s opinions are notable 
for the frequency with which they digress—in dicta of the most elaborate and extended sort—
from what appears to be the main point.”). 
 197. McKevitt v. Pallasch, 339 F.3d 530, 532 (7th Cir. 2003). 
 198. Id. The seven cases in question rely upon a variety of legal analyses and policy 
considerations in reaching at least a qualified privilege for journalists. See, e.g., In re Madden, 
151 F.3d 125, 128–29 (3d Cir. 1998) (“[T]he privilege recognizes society’s interest in protecting 
the integrity of the newsgathering process, and in ensuring the free flow of information to the 
public.”); United States v. Smith, 135 F.3d 963, 971 (5th Cir. 1998) (“[T]his privilege was 
justified because the balance of interests favored the press in civil libel cases, unlike the grand 
jury proceedings considered in Branzburg.”); Shoen v. Shoen, 5 F.3d 1289, 1292–93 (9th Cir. 
1993) (“[T]he privilege recognizes society’s interest in protecting the integrity of the 
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“harassment, burden, [and] using the press as an investigative arm of 
the government.”199 Instead, Posner wrote, because “these 
considerations were rejected by Branzburg even in the context of a 
confidential source, these courts may be skating on thin ice.”200 
Posner’s selective reading of Branzburg correctly noted that 
Powell fully joined the majority opinion.201 But in casting aside the 
considered opinions of seven other circuit courts, Posner failed to 
appreciate that Branzburg is a complex decision that leaves room for 
a potential reporter’s privilege. The holding of Branzburg explains 
that there is no constitutional privilege for reporters to be found in 
the First Amendment.202 Justice White’s majority opinion also states, 
however, that prudential and evidentiary concerns drive part of this 
finding.203 White amply shows his concern in these areas by his 
admission that “we remain unclear how often and to what extent 
informers are actually deterred from furnishing information when 
newsmen are forced to testify before a grand jury.”204 Presumably, if 
the deterrent effect became widespread, the press argument would be 
strengthened. 
B. Breaking News 
The San Francisco Chronicle reporters at the center of the 
swirling BALCO case are but two examples of a growing trend. 
Federal prosecutors are increasingly willing to seek to compel 
 
newsgathering process, and in ensuring the free flow of information to the public.”); United 
States v. LaRouche Campaign, 841 F.2d 1176, 1181–82 (1st Cir. 1988) (showing concern for 
“protection of confidential sources or information”); Von Bulow v. Von Bulow, 811 F.2d 136, 
142 (2d Cir. 1987) (“[The privilege] emanates from the strong public policy supporting the 
unfettered communication of information by the journalist to the public.”); In re Grand Jury 
Proceedings, 810 F.2d 580, 584–86 (6th Cir. 1987) (“[C]ourts should . . . make certain that the 
proper balance is struck between freedom of the press and the obligation of all citizens to give 
relevant testimony . . . .”); United States v. Caporale, 806 F.2d 1487, 1504 (11th Cir. 1986) 
(“[I]nformation may only be compelled from a reporter claiming privilege if . . . it is highly 
relevant, necessary to the proper presentation of the case, and unavailable from other 
sources.”). 
 199. McKevitt, 339 F.3d at 533. 
 200. Id. 
 201. Id. at 531. 
 202. See EUGENE VOLOKH, THE FIRST AMENDMENT AND RELATED STATUTES 670 (2005). 
 203. Branzburg v. Hayes, 408 U.S. 665, 693–94 (1972) (commenting on the “[e]stimates of 
the inhibiting effect of such subpoenas” and dismissing as “speculative” the injury the press 
could suffer). The dissenting opinions, naturally, accepted the reporters’ claims of injury as 
more concrete. 
 204. Id. at 693. 
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reporters to give up their sources, using grand jury investigations to 
wield subpoenas.205 
The incredibly politically charged case surrounding New York 
Times reporter Judith Miller and the leaked disclosure of the identity 
of CIA officer Valerie Plame is perhaps the highest profile example.206 
Many in the media abandoned Miller, feeling she had been a patsy for 
the Bush administration in the run-up to the Iraq war and in the 
resulting chaos.207 Whether this was legitimate criticism or not, Miller 
ultimately spent eighty-five days in jail for refusing to disclose the 
source of the leak—even though she had never written a story 
identifying Plame.208 Judging Miller’s case,209 District of Columbia 
Circuit Judge David B. Sentelle said that despite Justice Powell’s 
concurrence and the decisions of other courts, the Supreme Court in 
Branzburg broadly rejected any claims to a reporter’s privilege.210 
“The Highest Court has spoken and never revisited the question,” 
Sentelle wrote. “Without doubt, that is the end of the matter.”211 
Perhaps emboldened by this affirmation, the Justice Department 
subpoenaed a “secret” document obtained by the American Civil 
Liberties Union212 and the telephone records of New York Times 
reporters in an investigation into Islamic charities.213 And in 
 
 205. See, e.g., Editorial, Pentagon Papers Revisited; The Bush Administration’s Ever-
Expanding War on the First Amendment, WASH. POST, Dec. 15, 2006, at A34 (“[N]ot since the 
Nixon administration has the government so aggressively sought to crack down—not just on 
leakers, but on reporters and others who obtain leaked material.”). 
 206. E.g., Robert Scheer, Commentary, Embedded over Her Head in Washington, L.A. 
TIMES, Aug. 23, 2005, at B13. 
 207. E.g., Maureen Dowd, Commentary, Woman of Mass Destruction, N.Y. TIMES, Oct. 22, 
2005, at A17. 
 208. Marie Brenner, Lies and Consequences, VANITY FAIR, Apr. 2006, at 204. 
 209. In re Grand Jury Subpoena, Judith Miller, 397 F.3d 964 (D.C. Cir. 2005). 
 210. Id. at 969 (finding no material factual difference between Judith Miller’s case and 
Branzburg). 
 211. Id. at 970. 
 212. Robert Barnes, For ACLU, a Victory in Standoff with U.S., WASH. POST, Dec. 19, 2006, 
at A9. Barnes quotes ACLU officials as saying the document is “mildly embarrassing” to the 
government but does not involve serious national security matters. Id. The document was an 
information paper prepared by an Army judge advocate telling soldiers not to photograph 
prisoners of war or detained enemy combatants. Id. 
 213. Adam Liptak, Court Clears Way for Prosecutor to Review Records in Times Case, N.Y. 
TIMES, Nov. 28, 2006, at A20. There is a facile argument that if the information is available to 
multiple reporters—who pay nothing for the information—it is probably available to the targets 
of the investigation, who would potentially pay millions of their alleged secret funds. The two 
Islamic charities under investigation by the FBI for their links to terror organizations had 
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December 2006, the Army subpoenaed two journalists to testify in 
the court-martial of an officer who refused to deploy to Iraq.214 The 
issue also arose in a civil context, most notably in a suit by nuclear 
scientist Wen Ho Lee, who alleged that government leaks to the 
media violated his privacy.215 
It is perplexing, given that press freedom originated in the 
United States, that certain other countries provide more protection 
for reporters than does the First Amendment under Branzburg.216 The 
Supreme Court has considered changes in state law to reflect “an 
emerging awareness” among the states on matters of liberty.217 
Furthermore, the Court has looked to decisions abroad to reinforce 
its understanding of American law.218 Looking to state and 
international law as tools to interpret the possible First Amendment 
protection of reporters’ sources seems warranted. When the Court 
decided Branzburg in 1972, only seventeen states had established a 
reporter’s privilege. By 2007, forty-nine states and many foreign 
countries recognize varying forms of one.219 Perhaps these changes 
merit a more press-friendly interpretation of Branzburg. 
The BALCO case in particular gives reason to question the 
necessity of certain reporter subpoenas. In that case, eventually, an 
FBI investigation found the source of the leak was a defense 
attorney.220 Federal authorities made this determination through 
regular gumshoe investigation—having an informant secretly tape-
 
“millions of dollars in assets” seized. Neil MacFarquhar, Muslim Charity Sues Treasury Dept. 
and Seeks Dismissal of Charges of Terrorism, N.Y. TIMES, Dec. 12, 2006, at A24. 
 214. Bob Egelko, Army Subpoenas Journalists over Officer’s Quotes, S.F. CHRON., Dec. 18, 
2006, at B1. 
 215. Paul Farhi, U.S., Media Settle with Wen Ho Lee, WASH. POST, June 3, 2006, at A1. 
 216. See ABRAMS, supra note 23, at 280. Abrams notes that the European Court of Human 
Rights has found a reporter’s privilege. Similarly, in Germany, France, and Austria, among 
other nations, the government may never force reporters to identify confidential sources. 
Exceptions are “few and narrow” in Canada, Japan, and New Zealand. In Sweden, “it is a 
breach of law for journalists to reveal their sources.” Id. 
 217. See Lawrence v. Texas, 539 U.S. 558, 572 (2003) (finding that state laws decriminalizing 
sodomy reflect “an emerging awareness that liberty gives substantial protection to adult persons 
in deciding how to conduct their private lives in matters pertaining to sex”). But see id. at 598 
(Scalia, J., dissenting) (stating that “[c]onstitutional entitlements do not spring into existence 
because some States choose to lessen or eliminate criminal sanctions on certain behavior”). 
 218. See id. at 573 (majority opinion) (citing Dudgeon v. United Kingdom, 45 Eur. Ct. H.R. 
(ser. A) (1981) (a decision by the European Court of Human Rights)). 
 219. See supra note 184 and accompanying text. 
 220. Josh Peter, BALCO Leaks Exposed, YAHOO! SPORTS, Dec. 21, 2006, http://sports. 
yahoo.com/top/news?slug=jo-balco122106&prov=yhoo&type=lgns. 
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record conversations with the attorney.221 This showed the reporters’ 
testimony was never essential to the case, despite prosecutors’ 
protestations to the contrary. 
Even Justice Department insiders have questioned the wisdom 
and propriety of such prosecutorial actions,222 and their necessity is 
dubious. Justice Department officials themselves selectively leaked 
information in the BALCO case.223 Former Solicitor General 
Theodore B. Olson said, “[T]here is utterly no value in the current 
state of confusion.”224 Placing reporters under constant threat of 
subpoena for using confidential sources could amount to an 
impermissible, indirect prior restraint.225 
C. An Appeal for Discretion 
Prosecutors and judges relying on Posner’s dicta appear to have 
overstepped the Court’s allowance in Branzburg by wielding and 
upholding subpoenas of dubious necessity. From a policy perspective 
as well, the effort to seek out the testimony of reporters is 
questionable. 
The Court in Branzburg rejected an effort to create a 
constitutional reporter’s privilege or to require a compelling 
governmental interest to seek reporters’ testimony and make such 
subpoenas a last resort in the interest of justice. But if it is not a last 
resort, why is it not a first resort? That is, what is to stop prosecutors 
from regularly putting reporters on the stand? Why should they 
temper their zeal in seeking reporters’ testimony? Journalists can 
always name their source. They are the only ones, aside from the 
 
 221. Associated Press, Report: Lawyer Cited as Source of Leak in BALCO Case, ESPN 
NEWS, Dec. 21, 2006, http://sports.espn.go.com/espn/news/story?id=2705452. 
 222. Joe Garofoli, 2 Chronicle Reporters at Center of Media, Government Standoff, S.F. 
CHRON., Sept. 20, 2006, at A1 (quoting Mark Corallo, press secretary for former Attorney 
General John Ashcroft, as saying neither he nor Ashcroft would have approved of subpoenaing 
the BALCO reporters because “[i]n this case, there is no danger to life or issue of grave national 
security”). 
 223. See Associated Press, Graham to be Charged with Obstructing BALCO Probe, ESPN 
NEWS, Nov. 2, 2006, http://sports.espn.go.com/oly/trackandfield/news/story?id=2646248 (citing 
Justice Department officials “speaking on condition of anonymity . . . because the charges had 
not been made public”). 
 224. Olson, supra note 186 (“[T]he rules regarding what reporters must disclose, and under 
what circumstances, remain a hopelessly muddled mess.”). 
 225. See Fla. Star v. B.J.F., 491 U.S. 524, 533 (1989) (broadly condemning prior restraints on 
publication absent “a state interest of the highest order” (quoting Smith v. Daily Mail Pub. Co., 
443 U.S. 97, 103 (1979))). 
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direct source, who know the identity of the leaker. Why should any 
prosecutor exhaust other avenues? Certainly the press can fight back 
on the airwaves or on the news pages, because they buy ink by the 
gallon. Yet in this era of demonization, when surveys rank reporters 
alongside lawyers at the lower end of trustworthy professions,226 a 
prosecutor might be seen as heroic for going after the press. 
Considering the political launching pad that a U.S. Attorney position 
can be,227 the publicity—good or bad—is priceless. But political gain is 
no reason to convene a grand jury. 
Many reporters routinely destroy tape recordings and notes of 
interviews, until the point they are served with subpoenas.228 E-mail 
exchanges and anything stored to a company computer or server, 
however, may be retrieved if a subpoena is not quashed. E-mails 
between Fainaru-Wada and BALCO founder Victor Conte were 
cited extensively in court documents seeking to compel the reporters’ 
testimony.229 
The answer, in the absence of a federal shield law or a 
constitutional privilege, is discretion. Only a thin layer of judicial and 
prosecutorial discretion, bolstered by consistent and probing press 
coverage, prevents the press from becoming an investigative arm of 
the government. Although he found no privilege for the reporters in 
the Judith Miller case, District of Columbia Circuit Judge David S. 
Tatel applied case law and common law to suggest exactly this kind of 
discretion: 
In leak cases, then, courts applying the privilege must consider not 
only the government’s need for the information and exhaustion of 
 
 226. See The Harris Poll No. 61 at tbl.1 (Aug. 8, 2006), http://www.harrisinteractive.com/ 
harris_poll/index.asp?PID=688) (finding that journalists rank below athletes and just above 
members of Congress, while lawyers rank only above actors in public perception of 
trustworthiness). 
 227. See, e.g., Adam Liptak, For Federal Prosecutors, Politics is Ever-Present, N.Y. TIMES, 
Mar. 18, 2007, § 4 (Week in Review) at 3 (“[U.S. Attorneys] are political appointees who serve 
at the pleasure of the president, and they often use their jobs as political steppingstones.”). 
 228. Cf. Jack Shafer, Advice for Paranoid Reporters, SLATE, Apr. 25, 2006, http:// 
www.slate.com/id/2140499/ (last visited Sept. 27, 2007) (advising reporters to destroy their notes 
after publication). See generally The Reporters Comm. for Freedom of the Press, The First 
Amendment Handbook: Confidential Sources and Information: What to Do When You Are 
Subpoenaed, http://www.rcfp.org/handbook/c04p05.html (last visited Sept. 27, 2007) (advising 
reporters to “[n]ever destroy notes, tapes, drafts or other documents once . . . served with [a] 
subpoena”). 
 229. Lance Pugmire, Conte Is Linked to Stories Using Grand Jury Leaks, L.A. TIMES, June 
23, 2006, at D3. 
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alternative sources, but also the two competing public interests lying 
at the heart of the balancing test. Specifically, the court must weigh 
the public interest in compelling disclosure, measured by the harm 
the leak caused, against the public interest in newsgathering, 
measured by the leaked information's value.230 
Discretion, however, is more than a suggestion. It is a Supreme Court 
mandate after Branzburg.231 With due regard to Judge Posner, whose 
dicta can set off new legal strategies and influence other judges to 
acquiesce to his wisdom, there is some protection offered reporters by 
the Supreme Court. 
CONCLUSION 
Taken together, the Branzburg opinions—both published and 
unpublished—argue strongly for the careful exercise of discretion by 
prosecutors and judges in evaluating whether to seek to compel a 
reporter to testify. As the Supreme Court shifted from Black to White 
on press protection in the early 1970s, it nevertheless remained 
convinced that some press protection must exist. This was shown not 
only by Branzburg itself but also by White’s opinion in Tornillo.232 
The “relative ordinariness of the case”233 involving the BALCO 
leak belies the intense effort put forth by prosecutors to investigate it. 
As it became clearer that prosecutors were having difficulty pursuing 
the high-profile athletes they initially targeted,234 their attention 
turned to plugging leaks in their own case. There is extreme danger in 
an unchecked federal prosecutorial power to subpoena reporters and 
target the messengers rather than any real culprits. 
 
 230. In re Grand Jury Subpoena, Judith Miller, 438 F.3d 1141, 1175 (D.C. Cir. 2006) (Tatel, 
J., concurring). 
 231. See supra Part I. 
 232. Miami Herald Publ’g Co. v. Tornillo, 418 U.S. 241, 259 (1974) (White, J., concurring) 
(“Regardless of how beneficent-sounding the purposes of controlling the press might be, we 
prefer ‘the power of reason as applied through public discussion’ and remain intensely skeptical 
about those measures that would allow government to insinuate itself into the editorial rooms of 
this Nation’s press.”). 
 233. Liptak, supra note 5. 
 234. Popular opinion, although generally condemning steroid use among athletes, also 
reflected a growing concern about a prosecutorial witch hunt. Comedian Chris Rock joked on 
The Late Show with David Letterman that “[t]he government is not trying to get [Osama] bin 
Laden. They’re trying to get Barry Bonds.” Mike Penner, Morning Briefing, L.A. TIMES, Mar. 
14, 2007, at D2. 
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The previously unpublished private notes of the Supreme Court 
Justices and Chief Justice Burger’s draft opinion show strong 
prudential and historical sensitivity when they decided Branzburg. 
Although skeptical of any constitutional or common law claims by the 
reporters, the majority issued their decision assuming a base level of 
judicial and prosecutorial discretion. But if history is any indication, a 
new case before the Court—or a debate before Congress on a federal 
shield law235—would yield numerous examples of the breakdown in 
prosecutorial and judicial discretion. In such a case, the Court should 
mandate the discretion it relied upon in reaching its decision in 
Branzburg and recognize at least a qualified privilege for reporters. 
 
 235. Shield laws for reporters have been introduced repeatedly, but never passed, in both 
the U.S. House of Representatives and Senate. E.g., Walter Pincus, Senate Panel Freezes Bill on 
Legal Protection for Reporters, WASH. POST, Sept. 24, 2006, at A13. 
